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Press, 2011) 
 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OR CORPORATE GOVERNMENT? 
 
By BENJAMIN FARRAND* 
 
 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OR CORPORATE GOVERNMENT? - A REVIEW 





‘Quiet Politics and Business Power: - Corporate Control in Europe and Japan’1 
is the new book by Professor Pepper D. Culpepper, currently based at the 
European University Institute in Florence, Italy. In this ambitious work, 
Culpepper seeks to address the question of how corporate interests can shape 
policy. In order to do so, the book adopts a case-study methodology, analysing 
how corporate actors have been able (or not) to influence the development of 
law relating to corporate governance and hostile takeovers, focusing on 
examples taken from France, Germany, the Netherlands and Japan.  While 
being a work that falls categorically into the field of political sciences, it 
nevertheless is of value to lawyers and legal academics who wish to go beyond 
the question of what corporate governance is, and ask why corporate 
governance develops in a certain way.   
 
In Chapter 1, Professor Culpepper seeks to explain that whereas some writers 
in the field believe that regulation of issues such as the hostile takeover of 
companies is an ideological issue with legislative control (or protection) being 
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favoured by left-leaning political parties2, differences in regulatory mechanisms 
are not ideologically based, but are determined by ‘political salience’.  Culpepper 
defines political salience as being the importance of an issue to the average 
voter, relative to other political issues3.  In other words, where an issue is of 
high political salience, or of high importance to voters, then politicians are 
likely to exert strong influence over the direction of policy, most likely along 
ideological grounds (such as, for example, when dealing with issues such as 
income taxation).  Where issues are of low political salience, Culpepper argues, 
then issues are decided through ‘quiet politics’ – as the issues are regarded as 
being of low political importance to voters, and corporate actors are much more 
able to determine the direction of policy.  One such area, according to 
Culpepper, is corporate governance.  Due to the limited public interest in such 
subjects, corporations and corporate lobbying groups have much more 
influence over corporate structuring.  Furthermore, as these bodies are deemed 
to be experts in their fields, corporate representatives are substantially (and 
sometimes over-) represented on political committees concerned with corporate 
regulation.  Culpepper provides an empirical framework for analysis of these 
issues in Chapter 2, where change and stability in markets is examined, taking 
into account both the number of hostile takeovers attempted and the number 
of successful takeovers.  Culpepper presents this somewhat complex 
information in a systematic and effective manner, making frequent use of tables 
that help to break down information into digestible statistics.  While perhaps 
unsurprisingly the liberal free-market countries such as the United States and 
the United Kingdom dominate the tables of hostile takeovers attempted and 
achieved, countries such as Germany and the Netherlands demonstrate strong 
markets of patient capital – companies are predominantly characterised by 
concentrated ownership and few hostile takeovers.  In comparison, France and 
Japan have seen higher drops in stable ownership4.  Yet what explains these 
differences? 
 
Chapter 3 brings Culpepper’s hypothesis that political parties and political 
ideology are not the main reason for changes in corporate governance.  Both 
France and Germany saw left-leaning political parties come to power in the 
period between 1995 and 2006, yet the legislative efforts on hostile takeovers 
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differed significantly.  According to Culpepper, these differences reflected the 
differences in managerial structures and objectives in both countries – whereas 
German company managers preferred concentrated shareholding, French 
companies focused more on being competitive internationally and therefore 
relied more upon international capital markets, which favoured company 
deconcentration.  As a result, German companies lobbied extensively against 
adoption of certain clauses seen as unfavourable to concentrated shareholding 
in the EU Takeovers Directive5, whereas French companies lobbied strongly in 
favour of them.  As a result, Germany and French transposition of the Directive 
matched closely the desires of their respective companies.  Due to the low 
political saliency of the issues involved, corporations were able to achieve their 
desired objectives through both formal mechanisms such as influence over the 
transposition of Directives, and informal mechanisms such as internal 
preferences on the structure of the companies involved.  In Chapter 4, which 
considers the example of the Netherlands, Culpepper argues that while 
protections against hostile takeovers are formalised through legislation, this is 
not due to a ‘corporatist coalition’ of neoliberal parties existing between 1994 to 
2006, but due to the low political saliency of issues of corporate control.  
Voters, it is argued, were much more focused on high saliency issues such as 
taxation and immigration for much of this time6, and therefore the issue was 
not of primary concern to political leaders.  According to a quotation from the 
former Minister of Finance, Gerrit Zalm, ‘I would never make a cabinet crisis on a 
corporate issue.  I would make a cabinet crisis on budgetary policy or social insurance 
or tax reforms’7.  This is due to the low political saliency of the issue – voters 
care about social insurance, and less so about corporate takeovers.  This means 
that in the Netherlands, corporate regulation was often left to informal 
committees comprised substantially by corporate managers, who were left to 
dictate the specifics of particular acts of legislation.  Chapter 5 considers the 
case of Japan.  Unlike in the other examples, where governmental decisions 
coincided with the interests of companies, ultimately in the Japanese case, 
‘quiet politics’ were less useful to Japanese company managers, due to the high 
salience of issues of corporate control.  Before 2004, Japanese company 
managers were highly influential in the development of takeover legislation.  
However, in 2005, corporate control developed into a high salience issue.  The 
issue surrounded the concept of ‘triangular mergers’, where a company could 
create a subsidiary company in order to merge with a third company, yet do so 
on the basis of the combined shares of parent and subsidiary company.  
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Japanese companies were strongly opposed to the adoption of legislation 
legitimising such mergers, as it would leave Japanese companies open to hostile 
takeover bids by foreign investors.  Despite the strong lobbying of Japanese 
companies, Japanese legislators nevertheless adopted legislation that allowed 
for triangular mergers.  This refusal to accede to the wishes of corporate actors, 
argues Culpepper, is due to the saliency of the issue.  According to his 
argument8, the issue of hostile takeovers was highly mediatised in Japan post-
2005 due to a high profile hostile takeover – whereas prior to 2005 there were 
less than one article per month in Japanese newspapers relating to hostile 
takeovers, in 2005 and 2006 there was an average of 25 per month9.  Because of 
the strong media focus and apparent interest of the public in this matter, 
legislation was determined along party political lines through formalised 
institutions, rather than through informal management structures and 
corporate lobbying.  
 
The argument of political saliency brought by Professor Culpepper therefore 
helps to convincingly explain why in some fields corporate actors fail to gain 
their desired outcomes – if corporate policy was solely a question of lobbying 
and the view that ‘money talks’, then it would appear logically consistent that 
corporations would achieve their desires no matter the saliency of the topic at 
hand, and that Japanese company managers would have been able to water-
down or even drown the legislation pertaining to triangular mergers.  However, 
in areas of high political salience, even where substantial amounts of money are 
used in lobbying, corporate players are not guaranteed success.  While they 
may still be highly influential, ideology and voter preference will become more 
important.  This is expanded upon in Chapter 6, where Culpepper considers 
the issue of executive pay.  Traditionally considered an issue of low salience, 
executive pay has increasingly become an issue of high political salience.  Due 
to scandals such as the Enron scandal which broke in 2001, which combined 
high executive pay with perceived executive incompetence, issues of pay 
became highly salient issues in the US, with an increase from 184 articles to 545 
articles per year in the New York Times, Washington Post and Wall Street 
Journal alone.  Where political salience is high, companies are not able to rely 
on quiet politics, and must instead seek to rely more directly on partisan 
political protection, and try to counter or change public opinion10.  In the case 
of executive pay, Culpepper argues, public outrage over the fallout of the Enron 
crisis meant that despite extensive lobbying from corporations, a neoliberal 
centre-right government nevertheless introduced sweeping legislation to 
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regulate executive remuneration.  In comparison, in France the issue was much 
less salient, and until 2009, Nicholas Sarkozy left executive pay as a matter of 
self-regulation by the companies.  In 2009 however, a series of pay scandals and 
the economic crisis more generally began to change public perception of 
executive remuneration, and developed high political saliency.  As a result the 
Sarkozy administration, also representing neoliberal centre-right economic 
policy, acquiesced to demands for legislation governing executive pay.   
 
It is this reviewer’s belief that Professor Culpepper presents a very convincing 
argument.  ‘Quiet Politics and Business Power’ helps to explain why, when it 
comes to issues of corporate governance, centre-left governments have often 
allowed businesses to self-regulate and have legislated strongly in their favour, 
yet has also explained why centre-right administrations have in some instances 
legislated strongly against the interests of corporations.  By engaging in 
comparative analyses of hostile takeover legislation in several states, and using 
process tracing to determine not only how legislation is formulated but how 
governmental policy is changed by increased mediatisation and public interest 
in an issue, Culpepper provides a robust argument for considerations of 
corporate regulation which go beyond considerations of party ideology and 
pragmatism.  As such, this book may be of great benefit to lawyers and legal 
academics seeking to adopt an inter-disciplinary approach to issues of 
corporate governance which address not only questions of what corporate 
governance is and what laws dictate the regulation of corporations, but why and 
how corporate governance regulation comes about. 
 
